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Introduction
The Credit CARD Act of 2009 1 introduced a series of reforms intended to prevent practices in the credit card industry that lawmakers viewed as deceptive and abusive. The Act was signed into law in May 2009, and the majority of its provisions became effective nine months after the passage of the law-in February 2010. However, the signing of the law was preceded by a long series of events that made the changes almost certain long before May 2009.
In particular, at the end of 2008 the Federal Reserve Board adopted final rules pertaining to credit cards to protect consumers from unfair acts or practices with respect to consumer credit card accounts. The effective date for the Fed rules was several months after the CARD Act was to become effective. Therefore, the CARD Act superseded the Board's proposed rules, but by 2008-and possibly as early as 2007-issuing banks knew that the rules governing disclosure and rate increases were about to change.
Banks do not appear to have closed accounts at a higher rate between May 2009, when the CARD Act was signed, and when most of its provisions took effect in February 2010, based on our analysis of aggregate U.S. data and data from a monthly survey of U.S. consumers, the Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM). However, banks do appear to have changed terms on credit card plans during this period, especially by lowering credit limits. Among the CFM survey respondents whose bank accounts were closed during that period, account holders were much more likely to close their own credit card accounts than to have them closed by their card issuers.
Yet banks may have taken action in anticipation of the passing of the CARD Act long before it was enacted into law. The evidence shows that a higher fraction of credit card accounts were closed immediately following adoption by the Federal Reserve Board of its rules concerning credit cards than in the period between the law's enactment and its taking effect. This earlier period coincides with the recession, making it difficult to identify clearly whether the main cause of these closures was the economic downturn or preemptive action in anticipation of the new legislation.
Significant restrictions placed on credit card issuers by the Act include advance notice of any interest rate increase, a limit on the fees charged for late payments, and improvements in the transparency and consistency of billing cycles. In particular, consumers must be notified in writing at least 45 days in advance before the issuer raises the interest rate on their credit card account (exceptions include promotional and variable rates). Advance notice also must precede other significant changes, and consumers must be offered the right to close their accounts in response to those changes.
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Because the Act made it more difficult for the issuers to change the terms on their credit card plans and the law did not come into effect until nine months after its passage, issuers may have made some changes in advance of implementation of the law, and even in advance of the Fed rules. Once issuers knew that the credit card policy changes were about to become law, they may have raised interest rates or lowered credit limits before the law took effect. Anecdotal evidence suggests that credit card companies raised rates and fees and closed unprofitable accounts in advance of the legislation (for example, Connelly 2010).
We are interested in whether banks restricted credit supply to consumers beyond what was warranted by economic conditions. 3 The question we are investigating is as follows: Did banks move preemptively prior to the enactment of the CARD Act by closing credit card accounts, lowering credit limits, or otherwise deteriorating terms on credit card plans? 4 The
Federal Reserve's October 2009 "Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices" included a special question on banks' expectations with regard to the effects of the Credit CARD Act. As a result of the CARD Act, banks reported that they "expect to tighten or have already tightened" many terms on credit card loans for both prime and nonprime borrowers. 5 However, previous Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surveys conducted earlier in 2009 and in the second half of 2008 revealed that banks started tightening credit card lending standards and lowering credit limits on new and existing credit card accounts long before the CARD Act was signed into law. 6 We are interested in whether this tightening was due to something other than economic conditions.
2 Details of the bill are provided online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR00627:@@@R. 3 There is a broad literature linking exogenous shocks with the price and supply of bank loans (for example, Bernanke and Blinder 1988 , Peek and Rosengren 1997 , 2000 . 4 Consumers who would otherwise have closed their accounts may have kept them open in anticipation of the future benefits of the CARD Act. However, it is more likely that banks acted preemptively to curtail credit supply. 5 http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/200911/. 6 Although the CARD Act does not focus on credit limits, some of its provisions are related to credit limits: If a person has co-signed on a credit card account (typically for a minor), then the credit card issuer cannot change the limit without written consent from the co-signer; cardholders must now opt-in for the ability to exceed their credit limit; and annual fees and application fees are capped at 25 percent of the initial credit limit.
Because the period just prior to the Act coincided with the recession, it is difficult to separate the effect of the recession from that of the CARD Act. As a result of the recession, aggregate consumption and therefore demand for credit dropped, while at the same time the legislation changed the supply of credit and the terms of credit card plans. We therefore use individual consumer data to take advantage of cross-sectional differences among cardholders to try to separate the supply and demand effects. There is evidence that a higher fraction of credit card accounts were closed and credit card lending was tightened right after the Federal Reserve Board adopted its rules pertaining to credit cards. However, we do not find any evidence that banks made such changes just before the CARD Act became effective.
Several studies have examined the effects of the Credit CARD Act. Bar-Gill and Bubb A few studies examined the determinants of credit card limits independently of the Credit CARD Act. Dey and Mumy (2005) used a cross-section household survey to estimate approved credit limits. Gross and Souleles (2002a) used administrative data from credit card issuing banks and found that credit scores, debt levels, and account age affect credit card limits. Although credit card account closures have not been estimated directly, Campbell, Martinez-Jerez, and Tufano (2012) estimated the determinants of bank account closures. They find that in addition to socioeconomic characteristics, social variables, such as crime and voter turnout, and prevalence of alternative financial institutions, such as payday lenders, predict involuntary bank account closures. Related to credit card account closures, a number of papers have analyzed default risks for credit cards. These include papers that adjust for selection bias (Greene 2007) , account for consumer relationships to issuing banks (Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, and Souleles 2010) , and use duration models (Gross and Souleles 2002b) . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper analyzing the changes introduced by issuing banks between the time the Act was signed into law and the time when it became effective.
Section 2 describes the timing of the events leading up to the enactment of the CARD Act.
Section 3 describes changes observed in aggregate U.S. data, while Section 4 considers evidence based on individual data from the Equifax credit bureau and separate data from the Consumer Finance Monthly, a monthly survey of U.S. consumers. Section 5 provides regression results from an analysis of the survey data, and Section 6 concludes.
Timing of the events
The CARD Act was a result of a long-standing sentiment in the Congress that credit card issuers' abusive and unfair practices, such as hidden fees and unannounced interest rate increases, were hurting cardholders and should be prevented. Both the Congress and the Federal Reserve were involved in the various stages leading to this legislation. 
Aggregate trends in the credit card market
The as Figures 1 and 2 show, both the number of accounts and the total credit limit started declining even before the Board rules were adopted (line A).
The decline in the aggregate credit limit available to consumers has also been observed by others, such as FICO (2011) Separating demand and supply factors is always difficult, but because the period between the passage and the implementation of the CARD Act immediately followed the recession in the United States, 8 it is especially difficult to identify the cause of the changes in the credit market.
The steepest decline in the number of accounts took place before the CARD Act was signed into law, suggesting that the decline was-at least to some extent-caused by the recession. On the demand side, the economic recession likely caused a drop in demand for credit card spending and the closing of credit card accounts. Consumers may have reduced their spending because of the recession and revolvers may have wanted to curtail their debt. 9 On the supply side, the regulatory changes and the financial crisis made banks more reluctant to extend credit and induced lenders to curtail the amount of credit card lending. In addition, the cost of borrowing increased during that period. As shown in Figure 4 , the average annual percentage rate (APR) on credit cards declined to a low of 12 percent during the recession and rose by almost 2 percentage points before the CARD Act, peaking at just over 14 percent right before many of the Act's provisions took place. As Figure 4 indicates, the average yield on checking account and money market deposits-a measure approximating banks' cost of funds-did not increase during that period. Even though the rise in credit card interest rates leading up to the passage and implementation of the CARD Act is consistent with the hypothesis that issuers raised interest rates prior to the Act taking effect, several other factors-such as increased risk of lendingcould explain the rising interest rates.‫‬
Individual consumer evidence: Credit bureau and survey data

Credit bureau evidence
To help isolate the effects of the CARD Act on the terms of credit card plans, we examined individual-level credit bureau data from Equifax containing data on credit card accounts, credit limits, balances held, and repayment behavior from a 5-percent sample of all U.S.
consumers who have a credit history with Equifax. 10 The Equifax data also provide each consumer's risk score, a measure of the probability of default closely correlated with (but computed separately from) the FICO score. Unfortunately, the only demographic variable in the Equifax data is the respondent's age. Nevertheless, individual consumer data allow us to analyze account closings for consumers with the same credit card balances and delinquency status over time, thereby distinguishing issuers' account closing decisions based on those factors from account closing decisions based on the anticipated CARD Act.
Jimenez, et al. (2012) address the difficulty of disentangling the supply of credit from the demand for credit during times of low economic growth, when both the supply of and the demand for bank loans may decline, by combining individual loan data with specific bank-month effects to control for each bank's balance sheet strength. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to control for issuer-specific fixed effects, because we lack issuing bank identifying information.
The Equifax data do not include information on who closed the account-the account holder or the issuer-but only on the number of credit card accounts held by each consumer in a 10 Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) provide a detailed description of the data.
given quarter. We created a dummy variable C it equal to 1 if consumer i had at least one credit card account closed in quarter t compared with the previous quarter. From the number of credit card accounts consumer i held in quarter t (A it ), we subtracted the number of accounts held by consumer i in quarter t-1 (A i,t-1 ) and subtracted the number of new accounts consumer i opened in quarter t (O it ):
The dummy variable C it is equal to 1 if a consumer had fewer accounts in period t, indicating that at least one of his accounts was closed-either by the consumer or by his card issuer. closed in the CFM survey is consistent with the fraction found in the Equifax data. The CFM account closing rate is lower than the 12-month Equifax closing rate and is closer to the 9-month Equifax closing rate, but the discrepancy could arise from the fact that the CFM survey is selfreported and, as with any self-reported survey, it may suffer from the usual survey issues, such as poor recall and/or not wanting to admit to account closings.
∆A it is the change in the number of accounts consumer i held at time t relative to time t-1.
If ∆A it >0, the number of accounts increased, while if ∆A it <0, the number dropped. Figure 6 plots the average change in the number of credit card accounts from the previous quarter by the 11 The Consumer Finance Monthly survey is conducted by the Ohio State University. The credit card accounts could have been closed either by the cardholder or by his/her bank.
Equifax risk score, while Figure 7 
Consumer survey evidence
Although the Equifax data do not provide any information on who closed the credit card accounts-whether the consumer voluntarily closed his account or whether his issuing bank The partial list of added questions and the means of the variables based on those added questions are shown in Table 3 . 13 A consumer might decide to close his account in the recession in order to reduce his credit card debt, but that reason is unrelated to the CARD Act. 14 For additional information about the CFM data, see http://www.chrr.ohio-state.edu/content/surveys/cfm/cfm.html.
In addition to the overall means, we separated the sample into two periods: up to and The vast majority of people who were employed at the time of the survey had been employed during the entire preceding 12 months (92 percent), but 13 percent of them had had their work hours cut during that time. The numbers were almost identical for the respondents' spouses. Household income remained the same as a year earlier for about half the sample and decreased for about a quarter of the sample. Below, we test whether these employment or income changes had a significant effect on the likelihood of the respondent's bank changing the terms on credit card plans. Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents who had their credit card account closed by their issuing bank or who closed it themselves, and the major reasons for the closures. We are primarily interested in survey responses up to February 2011, when the preceding 12 months included the period of time before the CARD Act was effective but after it was passed and therefore certain to become law. In response to questions about credit card account closures, only 4.5 percent of the respondents said that a bank had closed their credit card account during the previous 12 months. The main reason for account closing was an inactive account. In contrast, 14.9 percent of the respondents said that they closed one or more of their credit card accounts themselves. Among those who closed their own accounts, only 14.9 percent cited a change in terms of credit card plans as the main reason, and the most common change triggering a customer's request for closure was an increase in the annual interest rate. Therefore, the CFM dataset provides some support for the hypothesis that card issuing banks may have raised interest rates preemptively prior to the rule changes affecting their ability to change interest rates at will.
Yet, there is little evidence that banks closed accounts at a higher rate during the period shortly before the CARD Act became effective. However, as the Equifax data shown in Figure 5 demonstrate, the peak in account closures took place prior to the period covered in the CFM survey questions. responses were statistically significant, as indicated by asterisks in the last column of Table 3 .
Even though there were no significant differences in the rate of account closings, banks were significantly more likely to change the terms on credit card plans before February 2011, especially to lower the credit limit. Comparing the two time periods, there was a large and significant decline in the fraction of respondents reporting changes in their credit limits. At the same time, as an answer to the "Because the terms changed, decided to …" question, there was a large and significant decline in the fraction of respondents saying that they were going to spend less on credit cards and less overall. It is not clear, however, whether consumers intended to spend less in response to the changes in their credit limits. The summary statistics based on the CFM survey do not yield conclusive results about account closures or changes in terms on credit card plans between the time when the CARD Act was signed into law and when it was implemented. Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (2) While the Equifax data do not support the hypothesis that credit card issuers closed accounts specifically in anticipation of the CARD Act becoming effective, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in credit card account closures is correlated with the adoption of the Federal Reserve credit card policies. 16 The fraction of consumers with fewer accounts rises sharply even when controlling for each consumer's age and FICO score.
Regression results
Card account closure using Equifax data
Card account closure using consumer survey data
To control for individual cardholders' income and demographic attributes, we used the CFM data to estimate probit regressions with the following dependent variables: (1) a dummy variable equal to 1 if a consumer's account was closed either by a bank or by the consumer, (2) a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank closed the respondent's credit card account, (3) a dummy variable equal to 1 if a respondent closed his credit card account, and (4) a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank changed the terms of the respondent's credit card accounts. We control for losing a job, a decline in work hours, a decline in income, making a late payment, education, gender, race, and quarterly time dummy variables.
The results are reported in Table 5 . No variables were significant in predicting consumerinitiated closures. Losing a job or making a late payment during the previous year were significant predictors of bank decisions to close an account. Several variables were significant predictors of changes in the terms on credit card plans: losing a job, having hours cut, and making a late payment all raised the probability of having terms changed. Respondents with at least some higher education and those who experienced an increase in household income also witnessed a change in terms, although the terms may have changed in their favor (for example, an increase in the credit limit). The quarter indicators show significant differences between the excluded period (2010:Q1-2010:Q2) and other periods for changes in terms on credit card plans, confirming that banks were more likely to change terms during the earlier part of the period covered by the sample questions. 17 No time pattern was found for account closures. It is possible that consumers are more likely to underreport card account closings by banks than the other measures discussed here, because of embarrassment or other emotional issues, while the change in the terms of credit cards is a more objective measure, producing more reliable results.
Conclusion
We investigate whether credit card issuers closed credit card accounts, lowered credit limits, or otherwise deteriorated terms on credit card plans between the time when the CARD Act was signed in May 2009 and when most of its provisions became law in February 2010.
Based on aggregate U.S. data and on data from a monthly survey of U.S. consumers, we do not find evidence that banks closed accounts at a higher rate, but we do find evidence that banks changed terms on credit card plans, especially by lowering credit limits between the time when the CARD Act was signed into law and when it took effect. Data from the Consumer Finance
Monthly survey show that respondents were much more likely to close their own credit card accounts than to have their accounts closed by the issuers. This pattern is likely attributable more to the economic recession than to the regulatory changes.
However, credit card issuers anticipated the passing of the CARD Act long before the Act was signed, and so the period studied here may not be long enough to capture the relevant changes. In particular, there is evidence that a higher fraction of credit card accounts were 
a linear probability regression of account closure, controlling for the number of credit cards in delinquency, active credit cards, and dollar value of credit card debt. The quarterly dummy coefficients represent the probability of account closure in a given quarter, when controlling for credit card delinquency, the number of credit cards, and dollar value of credit card debt. 
